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Afghanistan’s Fate Will Be Shaped by Geo-economics



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By Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco

Geo-economics was originally defined by the strategic thinker Edward Luttwak as the logic of conflict expressed through the grammar of commerce. As such, it represents an analytical model that is appropriate to examine the involvement of geopolitical forces in the economic sphere of wealth, markets, trade, business, and money. The contemporary pertinence of this hybrid paradigm has been emphasized by structural game-changers like rising economic multipolarity, the weaponization of complex interdependence, the quest to control scarce raw materials, the recurrence of systemic financial crises that unleash disruptive consequences, the ongoing struggle to master advanced technologies, the growing role of the state in economic affairs, the proliferation of all manner of illicit flows, and the conformation of regional blocs to pursue shared interests through combined strength.

In the particular context of Afghanistan, the limited usefulness of sheer military might has been dramatically demonstrated in the withdrawal of Soviet and American forces, both of which were overwhelmingly superior ‒ in terms of weaponry, technology, and economic resources ‒ to the local insurgents they were trying to crush. The defeat of both superpowers means that hard power alone is not enough to shape the course of events there. In fact, the facts on the ground illustrate that trying to conquer Afghanistan with armies can be counterproductive for foreign invaders. Venturing into such a black hole can end up depleting their power, resources, vitality, and morale.

On the other hand, the recent takeover of the Taliban has been seen as an event that can encourage acts of jihadist terrorism. Although their victory will be seen as a source of inspiration for Sunni Islamist militants all over the world, the Taliban are likely aware that, although the prospect of actively sponsoring transnational Salafism ‒ the uncompromising fundamentalist ideology championed by entities such as al-Qaeda and various branches of ISIS ‒ represents a powerful threat that can be instrumental in exacting concessions from heavyweights interested in containing said phenomenon, Taliban leaders must calculate carefully the repercussions of their actions. As history has demonstrated, playing hardball with great powers always carries the risk of harsh reprisals.

In summary, using force to determine the fate of Afghanistan can be dangerous for both the Taliban and the external players that are participating in the latest version of the ‘Great Game.’ However, that does not mean that immobility will prevail. In fact, there are alternative options that can be even more effective than the kinetic projection of power and much less problematic as igniters of overt conflict. Hence, the cards that are waiting to played include natural resources, opium, and regional synergic partnerships.

Natural Resources

According to media leaks from a decade ago ‒ back when Afghanistan was still under American military occupation‒ the US had allegedly discovered mineral deposits worth nearly one trillion dollars. Such sources even claimed that the Pentagon’s internal documents reported that Afghanistan could become “the Saudi Arabia of lithium” in the near future. That metal is crucial for the batteries of both electronic devices and electric cars; it is also crucial for military delivery systems of nuclear weapons and the manufacture of solar energy storage technologies. Likewise, research undertaken by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) suggests that Afghanistan’s mineral wealth also contains 1.4 million tons of rare-earth minerals. These lanthanides ‒ whose distribution across the globe is remarkedly uneven ‒ are instrumental for state-of-the-art technological civilian and military innovations related to the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution.” Hence, demand for said resources responds to both market forces and statecraft.

Although the exact figures are disputed, it seems Afghanistan offers substantial amounts of strategic metallic minerals. Access to them and their control are matters of national security, especially in an environment in which China and the United States are engaged in a growing rivalry for technological superiority and global geo-economic leadership. Considering the current state of affairs in terms of comparative advantages and the present correlation of forces after the chaotic pull-out of US forces, it looks as though Beijing is better positioned to become the highest bidder in the race to claim the prize. After all, the Chinese have the necessary capital, the political will to approach the Taliban, and the capability to develop the infrastructure networks that would have to be created. However, it is unknown if the Middle Kingdom could count on stable security conditions in a country’s whose hinterland has been unruly ‒ to say the least ‒ for decades.

In addition, Afghanistan’s underground treasures contain considerable amounts of hydrocarbons, including both natural gas and oil, particularly in areas located in close proximity with its border with Tajikistan. The USGS estimates that gas reserves total 15.7 trillion cubic feet, whereas oil reserves would amount to 3.6 billion barrels. Apparently, Soviet geologists, statesmen and policymakers were aware of this when Afghanistan was under the occupation of the USSR but back then the Eurasian communist superpower’s irreversible economic downturn was already underway. Nonetheless, things are different right now. For instance, China, India and the European Union are desperately trying to guarantee their energy security, a goal that requires the diversification of their suppliers. Furthermore, Russia, Iran and certain states from the post-Soviet space ‒ such as Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan ‒ are trying to use their exports of energy resources to advance geostrategic interests. Hence, Afghanistan can act as a provider and, through transnational pipeline networks, also a ‘crucial transit corridor’ in the supply of energy for Eurasian economies dependent on external sources.

Finally, the territory of Afghanistan also has abundant deposits of high-quality gemstones like lapis lazuli, emeralds, beryl and tourmaline, as well as small quantities of rubies and aquamarine. Although the industrial applications of these minerals are limited, their natural beauty and applications in jewelry make them assets whose economic potential can be harnessed for the sake of development and prosperity. So far, geopolitical volatility has been an obstacle for their systematic commercial exploitation and unlawful extraction is seemingly an endemic problem. However, if a reasonable degree of stability can prevail, then perhaps the situation can change for the better.

The Opium Trade

Opium is not just an illicit drug. In fact, it operates as a highly strategic commodity for several reasons. Opium poppies must be grown under specific geographic conditions that only exist in certain specific locations. Moreover, opiates circulate through long transnational logistical chains and sophisticated concealment methods are needed so that they can cross borders; and, perhaps more importantly, the control of these flows represents profit margins worth fighting and dying for. Moreover, the governance structure of the markets in which opiates are traded is exceedingly complex, as it usually involves actors like organized crime networks, warlords, terrorists, insurgents, strongmen, smugglers, and corrupt government officials and businessmen. However, its unsavoury nature goes much further than that.

In fact, the drug trade is one of the key global engines of money laundering, the financial process whose purpose is to carry out transactions and operations conceived to hide the true nature of illicit profits and make them look legitimate. The volume of this phenomenon cannot be underestimated. In order to keep things in perspective, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), money laundering represents between 2% and 5% of global GDP. Moreover, some former officials of said intergovernmental agency have even openly stated that the constant inflow of drug money prevented the collapse of some big banks in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. It is important to note that money laundering cannot be understood without considering the role played by corporate financial entities whose powerful connections make them untouchable ‒ ‘too big to prosecute’ ‒ and the complicity of a constellation of offshore jurisdictions that provide conditions of strict secrecy for banking activities.

As some analysts have noted, the drug trade flourishes in a ‘covert netherworld’ that attracts the participation of intelligence agencies interested in discreet sources of funding for clandestine operations or in a subtle and stealthy way to destabilize enemy states. It must be borne in mind that opiates can be weaponized because their harmful effects and their addictive nature make them highly corrosive for their consumer markets. After all, the widespread consumption of opiates in a society is detrimental for economic development, law enforcement, public health, social cohesiveness and overall societal wellbeing.

Concerning the particular case of Afghanistan, according to official statistics in the latest edition of the World Drug Report, prepared by the UNODC, the Central Asian country represents roughly 76% of the total hectares dedicated to opium poppy cultivation on a global scale. When in power for the first time, the Taliban ‒ inspired by Sharia Law’s strict condemnation of many psychoactive substances ‒ had managed to pretty much eradicate the cultivation of the crop on Afghan soil. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect a similar course of action now that the Taliban are in charge once again.

However, the Taliban government faces a dilemma that cannot be easily solved. The cultivation of opium poppies is likely the only source of income for a substantial amount of the impoverished and war-torn country. Suppressing the practice abruptly would deprive many rural people of the only functional way of making a living that’s available to them. Needless to say, such a decision would fuel discontent and perhaps even unrest, particularly in an economic context shaped by rising food costs. On the other hand, a deliberate policy of benign neglect might invite unwanted attention, diplomatic pressure, or even coercive measures from regional powers.

There are signs that the Taliban are inclined to act pragmatically and their statements indicate that they would be willing to attract investments that generate reliable ‒ and legal ‒ sources of income. That would likely entail a crop substitution program, but the attainment of concrete outcomes as a result of such projects will require time. Progress does not materialize overnight, and that is a problem when there are pressing needs waiting to be satisfactorily met.

Yet there are a couple of counterintuitive possibilities that might be considered in the meantime. The first has to do with the legal cultivation of opium poppies for the production of morphine, a powerful painkiller that is needed for medical purposes in times of both peace and war. Nevertheless, ensuring the appropriate standards and regulations are implemented is notoriously challenging in a place like Afghanistan. The second would involve the strategic weaponization of opium flows against countries seen as hostile, a Machiavellian card of statecraft that could pay off, even though it would entail meaningful risks.

Interestingly, both hypothetical courses of action are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is never unwise to bear in mind that extraordinary circumstances demand extraordinary measures, especially when the benefits outweigh the costs. As Henry Kissinger used to say, virtue in statesmanship and altruistic charity work are two very different things.

 Afghanistan as Geo-economic Land Bridge

Afghanistan’s rugged terrain and its lack of navigable rivers are factors that discourage internal economic dynamism. Moreover, the country’s landlocked position means that it cannot easily participate in international trade. However, the geography of this Central Asian country is both a curse and a blessing. In fact, the territory of what is nowadays Afghanistan was a critical land bridge for the legendary Silk Road, a corridor that facilitated the circulation of goods, currencies, people, technologies, ideas, languages, art, recipes, religions and armies throughout the Eurasian landmass. Far from being a historical curiosity about classical antiquity, this is a card that the Taliban can play vis-a-vis great powers interested in furthering their influence in Afghanistan.

For instance, Afghanistan can play a pivotal role in the ongoing projects of transnational interconnectedness masterminded by China. In fact, there are several reasons why courting Afghanistan as a geoeconomic partner would make sense for Beijing’s national interests. First, access to its vast deposits of mineral wealth and energy resources would boost the competitive strength of leading firms within Chinese strategic industrial sectors. Likewise, Afghanistan could be integrated via infrastructure projects into the Belt and Road Initiative as a gateway for deepening ties with Iran and Central Asia, especially as an insurance policy in case turmoil engulfs Pakistan. Moreover, there are also security concerns. China needs to make sure that the Taliban does not support Islamist unrest and separatism in Xinjiang and the attractive offer of economic incentives can serve that purpose. Finally, these carrots can be provided in exchange for the collaboration of Afghanistan in Beijing’s regional security frameworks, namely the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

From the viewpoint of the Taliban, China is an attractive partner based on economic, political and strategic criteria. Since Afghanistan has been deprived of access to Western economic and financial circuits, it has no choice but to adopt an eastward geoeconomic orientation. Plus, China can provide the capital needed to promote investment and business projects, as well as provide funds for the reconstruction of the country. Furthermore, Beijing ‒ unlike Washington and Brussels ‒ is a nonjudgmental practitioner of realpolitik, which does not seek to transform the socio-political models of other nations to remake them in its own image or to export its civilizational values.

Additionally, considering the Chinese plans to establish parallel international financial and monetary systems that bypass Western nerve centers, Beijing can help the Taliban deflect restrictions imposed by the US. In fact, the growing presence of stateless cryptocurrencies in Afghanistan is a powerful sign of the imperative to find reliable alternatives. In this regard, a noteworthy precedent that needs to be taken into account is the fact that that Afghanistan is already a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank whose funds can fuel economic activities in the Central Asian country. In the not-so-distant future, Kabul could even consider the possibility of joining the monetary circuits of the e-yuan if the Chinese official digital currency project reaches a substantial degree of international projection.

 Concluding Remarks

Traditional geopolitics represents a timeless paradigm whose worldview can explain historical and contemporary international phenomena related to power, conflict, hegemony, polarity and the political control of physical space. However, its classical focus on military and diplomatic matters has its limits because it often overlooks other relevant factors that must be assessed as well, especially in an era of complex interdependence. In this regard, geoeconomics offers an instrumental lens to scrutinize the economic, mercantile, financial and monetary dimension of statecraft, grand strategy and rivalries.

Particularly, the case of Afghanistan shows that geoeconomics also entails the ability to foresee conceivable trajectories. Thus, this analysis reveals that the country’s fate will be largely defined by impersonal geoeconomic forces and realities ‒ associated with minerals, narcotics and regional spheres of influence ‒ but only the power of human agency can determine how the key players will move their pieces in the game that is unfolding on the Eurasian geo-economic chessboard.

Courtesy: Geopolitical Monitior

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The Death of Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi




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By Patrick Wintour

The death of the Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, in a helicopter crash comes at a time when the country, faced by unprecedented external challenges, was already bracing itself for a change in regime with the expected demise in the next few years of its 85-year-old supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

In the country’s hydra-headed leadership where power is spread in often opaque ways between clerics, politicians and army, it is the supreme leader, and not the president, that is ultimately decisive. Indeed, in some ways the posts of president, and prime minister – originally based on a model of the French constitution – became overwhelmed in the drafting of Iran’s constitution in 1979, leading to advocates of a more powerful presidency to claim the role was being subsumed in a form of autocracy created in the name of religion.

The presidency, however loyal to the supreme leader – and Raisi was considered very loyal to Khamenei – is often cast in the role as a useful scapegoat helping the supreme leader to avoid criticism. That certainly became the fate of Raisi’s predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, who became a punchbag for decisions taken elsewhere. In recent months Raisi, elected president in 2021 but in practice handpicked by the supreme leader, had been mentioned as a possible successor to Khamenei. His death instead clears a thorny path for Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei.

The choice is made by an 88-strong “assembly of experts”, and Raisi’s departure certainly increases the chances of a hereditary succession in Iran, something many clerics oppose as alien to Iran’s revolutionary principles. Raisi’s death will add to the sense of a country already in political transition. A new hardline parliament was only just elected on 1 March in which turnout for some of the elections fell below 10%, and was overall presented as reaching a nationwide turnout of only 41% – a record low.

Reformist or moderate politicians were either disqualified or soundly beaten, leaving a new and, as yet, untested division in parliament between traditional hardliners and an ultra-conservative group known as Paydari or the Steadfastness Front. The effective exclusion of reformists from political participation in parliament for the first time since 1979 adds to the sense of a country in uncharted waters.

The cumulative disruption also comes at a time when Iran can ill afford such uncertainty as it faces western challenges over its nuclear programme, a dire economy and tense relations with other Middle Eastern states, especially with regard to relations with Israel and the US.

The loss of Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the foreign affairs minister, in the helicopter crash only adds to a sense of instability for a country that prided itself on control and predictability. His most likely successor is his deputy, Ali Bagheri, but hardliners may regard him as too willing to negotiate with the west over Iran’s nuclear programme.

Although Iran has not lost a president in office since the revolution in 1979, the country has a clear formal system for succession in which the first vice-president – currently Mohammad Mokhber – takes charge. Few regard Mokhber, a banker and former deputy governor of the Khuzestan province, as presidential material. A new president should be elected within 50 days, giving the supreme leader and his entourage relatively little time to select someone that will not only become president at such a critical time, but also will be in a strong position succeed Khamenei himself. The immediate challenge of any new leader will be to control not just internal dissent, but the factional demands within the country to take a tougher line with the west and draw closer to Russia and China.

With the sudden death of President Ebrahim Raisi, the Iranian regime unexpectedly finds itself faced with having to hold elections to appoint a successor. The choice for Tehran is whether to allow the vote to be semi-democratic and contested, or risk nothing by ensuring no candidate with any organisation or following stands against the hardliner likely to be chosen as the regime’s preferred candidate. It is not likely to be a long discussion.

Recent experience suggests the regime will opt for the safety of an election in which its chosen candidate has no serious rival, even if this leads to a lower turnout and a disillusioned electorate. With so much external and internal pressure on the regime, central to which is the inevitable and looming need to replace the 85-year-old supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the regime is not likely to leave much to chance. This is a critical moment, Khamenei and his allies will believe, for continuity and security.

Such a decision comes with risks. Iran has a long and well-known history of filtering out potential political leaders from elections. All candidates have to be deemed qualified by an elite body known as the Guardian Council, and are interviewed to ensure their worthiness for high office.

In most cases, shunned candidates shrug their shoulders and walk away. Many do not even put their names forward, knowing they will be rejected. The less the process is challenged, the less its methods are scrutinised.

Over the last month, however, a public row about the process has developed between the former president Hassan Rouhani and the Khamenei-appointed Guardian Council which has gone to the heart of the arguments about the president’s role and legitimacy. The dispute stems from Rouhani, who was presidentfrom 2013-21, having been banned from standing this year for the Assembly of Experts, an 88-strong body that selects the supreme leader.

Rouhani, already bruised by the way he was treated as president, had refused to acquiesce on the matter. Last week, he wrote a scathing open letter that he said was written not out of personal ambition, but in defence of the republic, and insisting he would not be silent in the face of his attempted sidelining.

He revealed in correspondence with the Guardian Council that he had failed the qualification test on the grounds of insulting the judiciary and the council, lacking political vision and lacking commitment to the constitution – accusations he insisted were an attempt to usurp the authority of the president. He argued that if the Guardian Council could disqualify from future public office leaders with whom they had political, not religious, differences, the president is no longer answerable to the people, but to an unelected body.

Recalling the number of times he had been elected with the support of millions of votes, Rouhani asked: “Do the jurists of the Guardian Council with the least political, security and diplomatic experience have the expertise to disqualify candidates because of what they call political knowledge and insight? You who accuse the candidates of not knowing the people, how many times and in which competitive elections have you exposed yourself to the people’s vote?”

In the withering assessment of his treatment, he said he had been found guilty on the basis of evidence compiled by “agents whose files are a mixture of factional analysis and intercepted and mostly illegal wiretapping, and whose reports turn into vague and general letters with obvious purpose”.

He further warned: “Future presidents (if such an office and institution remains) should know that with this indictment, even they no longer have political freedom and will be unable to perform their legal duties, and instead of the constitution, they should be subject to the Guardian Council, Otherwise, do not doubt that the position of president at the end of the term of office (or even halfway) will be the ceiling and the last responsibility for which they are qualified.”

Referring to specific criticisms of his time in office, Rouhani defended his role in negotiating the landmark 2015 nuclear deal with the US under the Obama administration. Referring to Donald Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the deal in 2018, he said: “My government is proud that it was not only a government of negotiations, but also became a government of resistance when Trump’s unconventional government appeared in the United States.” The agreement had been endorsed by the supreme leader.

Equally, he said, a president had a right to speak about the judiciary’s flaws. And crucially, he argued, criticising others, as he did as president, was not unIslamic. “Freedom of speech is a right, although someone may use this right to say something wrong,” he wrote.

The cumulative effect of the Guardian Council’s actions, he said, would be to reduce voter participation.

Rouhani’s criticisms, written at a time when Iran was not expecting elections, will resonate with many, but the chances of his warnings being heeded and the supreme leader allowing an open field seem slim.

Recent experience suggests the regime will opt for the safety of an election in which its chosen candidate has no serious rival, even if this leads to a lower turnout and a disillusioned electorate. With so much external and internal pressure on the regime, central to which is the inevitable and looming need to replace the 85-year-old supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the regime is not likely to leave much to chance. This is a critical moment, Khamenei and his allies will believe, for continuity and security.

The perennial challenge to Iran remains relations with Israel, which reached a new pitch of danger in April when the two countries exchanged fire, sparked by an Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, and more broadly by Iran’s support for proxy groups willing to fight Israel, including Hamas and Hezbollah.

But any new president will have to make big decisions over Iran’s nuclear programme. On 9 May, Kamal Kharrazi, the supreme leader’s foreign policy advisor and former Iranian foreign minister, said Iran would consider a doctrinal shift to nuclear deterrence if Israel attacked what Iran said were civilian nuclear sites.

Rafael Grossi, the head of the UN nuclear inspectorate the IAEA, warned Iran to end the loose talk about developing a nuclear weapon, saying it was disturbing. Opponents of the regime, still powerful through civil resistance, will not mourn Raisi’s death due to his role in repressing the “woman, life, freedom” protests.

Older Iranians revile Raisi for his role as deputy prosecutor in Tehran in 1988 when, at the age of 28, he played a prominent role in a movement that killed as many as 30,000 political prisoners, mostly members of the People’s Mujahedin Organisation in Iran (MEK).

In 2019 he was chosen as head of the judiciary by Khamenei, a role he used to increase state hostage-taking and continue domestic repression through revolutionary courts.

Patrick Wintour is the Diplomatic Editor of the Guardian

Courtesy: The Guardian, London

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Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi Dies in Helicopter Crash




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The hardline Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, has died in a helicopter crash in foggy weather in the mountains near the border with Azerbaijan. The charred wreckage of the aircraft, which crashed on Sunday carrying Raisi, as well as the foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, and six other passengers and crew, was found early on Monday after an overnight search in blizzard conditions.

Fears had been growing for Raisi, a 63-year-old ultraconservative, after contact was lost with the helicopter on Sunday as it navigated fog-covered mountains in north-west Iran.

The helicopter carrying Ebrahim Raisi takes off near the border with Azerbaijan on Sunday. Photograph: Ali Hamed Haghdoust/AP

The country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – who holds ultimate power with a final say on foreign policy and Iran’s nuclear programme – said the country’s first vice-president, Mohammad Mokhber, would take over as interim president. The deputy foreign minister, Ali Bagheri Kani, was appointed as acting foreign minister.

“I announce five days of public mourning and offer my condolences to the dear people of Iran,” Khamenei said. Mokhber, like Raisi, is seen as close to Khamenei. Under Iran’s constitution, a new presidential election must be held within 50 days.

Iranian state media blamed bad weather for the crash and said it was complicating rescue efforts. Raisi’s convoy had included three helicopters, and the other two had “reached their destination safely”, Tasnim news agency reported.

The incident happened near Jolfa, a city on the border with Azerbaijan, about 375 miles (600km) north-west of the Iranian capital, Tehran. The president had been travelling in Iran’s East Azerbaijan province.

The state-run IRNA news agency broadcast footage of an Iranian Red Crescent team walking up a slope in thick fog, as well as live footage of crowds of worshippers reciting prayers in the holy shrine of Imam Reza in the city of Mashhad, Raisi’s home town.

Rescue team members work at the crash site of a helicopter carrying Raisi in Varzaghan, in north-west Iran Photograph: Azin Haghighi/MOJ News Agency/AFP/Getty Images

More than 70 rescue teams using search dogs and drones were sent to the site, the Red Crescent said, and the chief of staff of Iran’s army ordered all the resources of the army and the elite Revolutionary Guards to be deployed.

Iran owns a number of helicopters but international sanctions make it difficult to obtain parts for them. Most of its military air fleet predates the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Countries in the region sent their well-wishes and offers of support, including Iraq and Qatar, but also Saudi Arabia, which has long been a regional foe. The Saudi foreign ministry was following reports about the crash with “great concern”, the country’s state news agency reported.

The US president, Joe Biden, had been briefed on the crash, an American official said on condition of anonymity.NThe Turkish president said he was saddened to hear of the crash. “I convey my best wishes to our neighbour, friend and brother Iranian people and government, and I hope to receive good news from Mr Raisi and his delegation as soon as possible,” Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said in a post on the social media platform X.

The Iran-backed militant group Hamas, fighting Israeli forces in Gaza with Tehran’s support, issued a statement expressing sympathy to the Iranian people for “this immense loss”. Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hezbollah group and the Houthi rebels in Yemen also issued statements praising Raisi and mourning his death.

Raisi was a hardliner who formerly led the country’s judiciary. He was viewed as a protege of Khamenei, and some analysts had suggested that he could replace the 85-year-old leader.

He won Iran’s 2021 presidential election, for which the turnout was the lowest in the Islamic Republic’s history. Raisi was under sanctions by the US in part over his involvement in the mass execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988 at the end of the Iran-Iraq war.

Under Raisi, Iran enriched uranium at nearly weapons-grade levels and hampered international inspections. Iran has supplied arms to Russia in its war on Ukraine, and launched a substantial drone and missile attack on Israel. It continues to arm proxy groups in the Middle East, such as the Houthi rebels and Hezbollah.

Mass protests in the country have raged for years. The most recent involved the death in 2022 of Mahsa Amini, a woman who had been detained for allegedly not wearing a hijab to the liking of authorities.

The months-long security crackdown that followed the demonstrations killed more than 500 people and more than 22,000 were detained.

Reuters contributed to this report

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Red Notice: Putin is Nearby




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By Dr Chidi Amuta

Putin is nearby. Precisely, Russia’s ambitious global influencer of illiberal  order has docked next door. In Niger Republic to be exact. At the end of April, the military junta in Niger kicked out the American military advisers and tiny troop contingent from their country. Earlier, they had forced the U.S drone and surveillance base in Agadez to shut down. As part of a halfhearted diplomatic move to repair military relations with Niger, an American delegation went to hold talks with the regime in Niamey.

Almost on the same day, officials of the junta were reportedly showing a Russian military advance party around what used to be the American military base. The intent was obvious. The Russians were in the process of being handed the keys of what used to be a US base or at least preparing the grounds for an active security relationship with Moscow. Though the janitors are yet to hand over the keys of the former US base to the Russians, the signals are clear.

Earlier on, the military junta in Niger had chased away the French ambassador to the country, thus ending centuries of French influence in the country. Of course, the military dictators were towing the same line as their colleagues in Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea. A rushed end to French presence and influence in these former French colonies has since become the central foreign policy doctrine of the new autocrats in what used to be Francophone West Africa.

Official Moscow is still predictably silent on its intentions. But what is clear is Moscow’s preparations to replace the West, specifically the United State and France as the strategic influence in Niger Republic and its environs. And with the exit of both French and American military presence in Niger, the door has been thrown wide open for their replacement by Russia. Of course Russia’s interest in Africa especially West and Central Africa has never been disguised in recent times.

Prior to the demise of the bullish Yevgeny Prigozyn and the decline of his Wagner mercenary force, Russian commercial and security presence in these parts of Africa had been quite pronounced but diplomatically muted. Now what began as an expeditionary mercenary commercial interest is about to graduate into a full blown strategic military and security presence and interest from Moscow.

The presence of US troops and the drone base coupled with the presence of a French protection force in West Africa remained  for a long time part of the international arrangement to keep jihadist terrorists from drifting towards the south of West Africa. Countries like Nigeria were prime beneficiaries of the US presence in Niger. It was more importantly part of an international strategic engagement to barricade the region from a rampaging Jihadist onslaught from the Sahel.

This logic of containment and protection remained the major plank of Western influence remained valid until the rapid reduction of French presence and influence in the region by new military regimes. It all began with Mali which had earlier evicted French diplomats from Bamako. This was followed by the withdrawal of French protection troops from Mali and subsequently the other major West African former French territories now under military dictatorship: Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and possibly Chad.

There a historical context to Russia’s residual appeal in parts  of Africa. Instructively, in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the world was gripped by anxiety. On March 2nd, the UN General Assembly voted on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Of the 54 African member states, 28 voted against Russia while 17 abstained and 8 refused to show up. Towards Russia or more precisely the old Soviet Union, some nostalgia among an ageing generation of elite.

Many of these older African elite recall the days of the Cold War and the old USSR’s identification with Africa’s causes especially anti colonialism and anti Apartheid. Ideological nostalgia towards the Red Empire is strongest in places like Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa where political parties that pioneered the independence and anti racist struggles were backed by the old Soviet Union.

At the present time, Russian influence in Africa remains sporadic and uncoordinated but cannot be ignored as a significant part of the strategic future of the continent. In 2019, the inaugural Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi was attended by 43 African countries. It was a forum for Mr. Putin to critique the West’s policies towards Africa.

Nonetheless, Russia’s trade with Africa is only 2% of Africa’s goods trade with the rest of the world. A Russian bank VEB now under Western sanctions is a shareholder in the African Development Bank. Even then, Russia’s economic and military interest and roles in some African fragile states remains considerable. Russia is the largest arms supplier to African countries, a net extractor of mineral and other resources and a prop for fragile even if unpopular regimes. But with all its noisy presence in world affairs, Russia remains an unlikely agent of economic benefit for African countries.

The Russian economy is about the size of that of Italy. So, Russia is not in a position to act as an attractive agent of development in Africa. Russia is still a relatively poor country. Its companies playing in the African economic theatre are most extractive industry interlopers and state sponsored thieving entities. Russian infrastructure companies are still not interested in contracts in African countries. African tourist and business travel interests in Russia is next to zero. So, by and large any renewed Russian interest in parts of Africa will remain a matter of limited mutual convenience. Security assistance in return for opportunities for Russian rogue companies to come in and make some quick cash while the Russian state increases its foothold  and authoritarian leverage against the Western liberal order.

For Nigeria, the implications of the exit of two major Western powers from our immediate northern frontier are many and far reaching. Nigeria’s exposure in this regard are threefold. First, the security safe corridor  against jihadist terrorist expansion from the Sahel is instantly closed. Without American drones, intelligence and French troops on the ground, Nigeria is exposed. Our national security is further compromised. The jihadists are now free to roam free from centres in Niger into the troubled northern parts of Nigeria.

Secondly, the military presence of Russia in Niger and other parts of what used to be French West Africa immediately signals a decline of Western influence in the region and its replacement with an antithetical Russian influence. Russian security presence and strategic influence in an area now under military dictatorship effectively means the shrinking of the frontiers of freedom and democratic rule and its replacement with an authoritarian influence. Russian is not known to be a patron of democracy and freedom anywhere in the world. It cannot possibly export what it does not have at home.

Hidden under the above two meanings is a clear and present threat to Western influence in West Africa. The timing of this development in world history is fortuitous. We are in an era where the Cold War has been replaced by an increasing hemispheric war of nerves and rhetoric between Western democracies as we have come to know them and a rising authoritarian counter force. The counter force is being guaranteed by the growing influence and fortunes of China.  Russia, North Korea, Iran and other client states of the same ilk are taking shelter under China’s bloated bank accounts to keep the West uncomfortable.

Nigeria’s political response to the developments in Niger have shown little of an enlightened national self interest. At the time the coupists toppled Niger’s democratic government, Nigeria was in a position to prevent the coup and its nasty consequences. Former president Buhari had a close personal relationship with the democratic leadership in Niger.

Even after Buhari’s tenure, his successor Mr. Tinubu woefully failed to use his position as the new Chairman of ECOWAS to neutralize the coup in Niger. Nigeria was in an eminent position to use its economic and military preponderance in the region to stifle the Niger coupists. We failed.

A few tepid diplomatic threats and fickle sanctions failed to deter the dictatorship in Niamey. The junta got stronger, compared notes with those in Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea. They got stronger together and became a threat to ECOWAS from which they threatened a pullout. ECOWAS solidarity was broken. The bloc buckled. Its military weakness was on open display as they could neither effect an ultimatum to use force if necessary. Individual member nations reached out to the Niger and other dictators and made individual deals.

Nigeria’s resolve was broken. We shamefully restored electricity supply to Niger, lifted our limited and effete sanctions. And now the Niger junta has dug in and has admitted a potential destabilizing force into our immediate northern frontier. By creating room for the exit of the West from Niger and the tacit admission of Russian influence into the region, Nigeria has shot itself in the foot.

There is something more frightening in our political response to this development. The possibility that the United States and France could decide to pitch tent in Nigeria by negotiating military basing footholds here is far fetched. But even then, it is being opposed vehemently by some politicians instead of being welcomed enthusiastically.

In Nigerian political circles, the debate has been as to whether Nigeria should allow France and the United States to establish military bases in its territory. As is typical in our lazy politics of sectarianism, regionalism and divisiveness, the most eloquent voices of opposition to possible Western military bases in Nigeria have come from northern political voices. This is not only sad but also not backed by any iota of strategic insight and knowledge of basic national interests.

Ironically, the North is the region immediately exposed to the consequences of the withdrawal of Western forces from Niger. It has become the epicenter of national insecurity and instability of the kind associated with increasing jihadist activities. It is the home base of banditry. It is a free market for the spread of small and medium arms from the theatres of trouble in the Sahel, Northern Africa and the Middle East. It is the area where schools are being sacked and farming disrupted. It is the source of herdsmen turned into killers, armed robbers and kidnappers.

More pointedly, there is nothing that says that should Nigeria consider it strategically wise, Western military bases in the country must be located in any particular zone of the country. Such bases can be located anywhere in the country. And they often have collateral economic benefits to the host communities as in places like Djibouti, South Korea and Germany where US military bases are part of the local economic life.

In the world of modern technology, possible Western military bases can be located anywhere in the country. Advanced intelligence gathering and surveillance systems now allow major world powers to gather intelligence, order operations and manage military outcomes from virtually anywhere. The drones that decimated Al Queda in Afghanistan and Pakistan emanated from drone command bases in the deserts of far away Nevada. Donald Trump ordered the drone assassination of Iran’s General Soliman at Baghdad airport from the comfort of the Oval Office in far away Washington.

The long term strategic and overall national interest of Nigeria are better served if we rise above petty regional narrow views of the developments unfolding in our Northern frontier. First, we need to protect the nation from the spread of jihadist insurgency and terrorism. We need to remain enlisted in the international effort to defeat Jihadist terrorism decisively. We need to protect freedom and democratic rule as a heritage after more than four decades of military dictatorship in our history. Consequentially, we need to act in concert with the rest of the free world to discourage Russia’s active promotion and tacit marketing of authoritarianism and anti democratic ideas around the world.

Incidentally, among the salesmen of authoritarianism in the world, Russia is handicapped. Unlike China, Russia is neither an agent of economic development nor a model of cultural inclusiveness and universalism. Few free and happy people want to make Moscow their preferred holiday or business travel destination.

Dr. Amuta, a Nigerian journalist, intellectual and literary critic, was previously a senior lecturer in literature and communications at the universities of Ife and Port Harcourt.

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